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disclosure will take place.  Conclusion: DataSHIELD can pro-
vide a flexible means of interrogating data while protecting 
the participants’ confidentiality in accordance with applica-
ble legislation and guidance.  © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Large collections of biomedical data are becoming in-
creasingly available for use by the research community. 
Data resources from biobanks, cohort studies, and health-
care systems are being combined and shared in order to 
‘… accelerate health research and translation.’  [1] . These 
collaborations present administrative, ethical, and legal 
challenges as the confidentiality of the identifiable data 
collected from participants must be protected and its 
sharing controlled through applicable legislation, guid-
ance, ethics review, and data access mechanisms  [2] . 
While such controls rightly provide protections, there is 
a perception that they may also limit access to data and 
may hinder the research process  [3] . Yet the availability 
of large datasets and the moves to combine data hold the 
promise of being able to ask and answer increasingly 
complex questions that will significantly benefit human 
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 Abstract 
 Background: Data from individual collections, such as bio-
banks and cohort studies, are now being shared in order to 
create combined datasets which can be queried to ask com-
plex scientific questions. But this sharing must be done with 
due regard for data protection principles. DataSHIELD is a 
new technology that queries nonaggregated, individual-
level data in situ but returns query data in an anonymous 
format. This raises questions of the ability of DataSHIELD to 
adequately protect participant confidentiality.  Methods: An 
ethico-legal analysis was conducted that examined each 
step of the DataSHIELD process from the perspective of UK 
case law, regulations, and guidance.  Results: DataSHIELD 
reaches agreed UK standards of protection for the sharing of 
biomedical data. All direct processing of personal data is 
conducted within the protected environment of the contrib-
uting study; participating studies have scientific, ethics, and 
data access approvals in place prior to the analysis; studies 
are clear that their consents conform with this use of data, 
and participants are informed that anonymisation for further 
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health, questions that cannot be answered by one study 
alone  [4] . In addition, some funding agencies require re-
searchers to reuse and exploit the data coming from fund-
ed studies, for example, in the area of genomic research 
data and biobanking  [5] . This tension between protecting 
data confidentiality and enabling data use throws up 
varying challenges  [6] , some of which are addressed by 
new technological initiatives for the sharing of data across 
research studies.
 When data from several studies, or other sources, are 
to be coanalysed, 2 fundamental approaches exist  [1] . In-
dividual-level meta-analysis (ILMA) requires each par-
ticipating study to contribute individual-level data to a 
central pooled data repository. These centralised data 
may then be queried as flexibly and easily as if they had 
all been collected by one study. As an example, each bio-
bank involved in the German-Austrian Central Research 
Infrastructure for Molecular Pathology (CRIP) codes 
specific data, which are then imported into the CRIP In-
house Research Database and aggregated  [7] . Terms re-
flecting between-study heterogeneity must typically be 
incorporated. Individual-level data are variously referred 
to as ‘individual patient data’ by meta-analysts and as ‘mi-
cro-data’ by bioinformaticians  [2] . As an alternative, 
combined analysis may be based on study-level meta-
analysis (SLMA). Here, the precise analysis to be under-
taken is specified ahead of time. Each study then analyses 
its own data under the prescribed analysis plan and re-
turns the result of each component of the plan to an anal-
ysis centre (AC) which then meta-analyses those results 
to provide answers across all studies combined.
 From an analytic perspective, ILMA is generally to be 
preferred. Because the analysing statistician has direct ac-
cess to the data, analysis is completely flexible, and com-
plex data can be explored without a need for a tightly 
prespecified analysis protocol. Furthermore, some types 
of analysis can  only be undertaken using individual-level 
data, and ILMA can sometimes be more efficient. On the 
other hand, an ILMA can raise serious ethico-legal and 
governance issues. Obviously, if the individual-level data 
to be shared include unique personal identifiers, such as 
an NHS number or a social security ID, individuals will 
be immediately identifiable. ‘Pseudo-anonymised’ or 
‘coded’  [8] data protect against identifiability by strip-
ping off identifiers and replacing them with codes that 
can only be mapped to an individual using a key that is 
kept confidential by the releasing study. Nevertheless, as 
more variables are released, there is an increasing risk 
that in combination they provide enough information to 
identify some individuals  [9–11] . Consequently, many 
studies have  some restriction on the release of individual-
level data, and this can hinder ILMA. For example, if the 
original consent forms, which participants signed in join-
ing a study, implied that their individual-level data would 
 never be shared with researchers external to the study it-
self, this would preclude  any ILMA-based meta-analysis 
involving analysis elsewhere. Alternatively, an informa-
tion leaflet implying that individual-level data would 
never be sent overseas would restrict international ILMA 
 [12] .
 To circumvent this problem, many research groups 
use SLMA rather than ILMA. SLMA is well illustrated by 
a typical genome-wide association study (GWAS). Here, 
each study undertakes a GWAS only on its own data. The 
association statistics for each variable (here a SNP) in 
each study are then shared and submitted to a standard 
meta-analysis at a designated AC. Crucially, the associa-
tion statistics are calculated at the level of  the study and 
so can freely be shared amongst collaborative partners, 
even if there is a formal ethico-legal embargo on sharing 
individual-level data. Providing a real-world illustration 
of this approach, the US Food and Drug Administration 
‘Sentinel’ Initiative is creating an electronic network that 
will operate across different data sources in order to mon-
itor medical products approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration  [13] . Currently, each site transforms sub-
sets of their data into an agreed format, and a coordinat-
ing centre then asks each site to run queries and return 
only  summary  or aggregated data . No individual-level 
data leave any participating site, yet information can use-
fully be shared. Unfortunately, there is a serious scientific 
drawback to an SLMA. That is,  all  queries must be pre-
specifiable so each site can perform the same analyses to 
produce the same set of summary statistics. This require-
ment seriously restricts the ability to conduct richer, 
more exploratory analyses – unless one is willing to re-
peatedly send out new analytic requests and to wait for 
the required summary statistics to be returned.
 DataSHIELD  [14] reflects a radically different ap-
proach to both ILMA and SLMA. The data in each re-
pository are analysed at an individual level, but  separate 
and parallelised analyses are undertaken simultaneously 
in each study. Nevertheless, a typical DataSHIELD analy-
sis is mathematically equivalent to pooling all of the data 
centrally and carrying out a single analysis  [15, 16] . Sum-
mary statistics – commonly score vectors and informa-
tion matrices – are returned by each study to the analyst 
( fig. 1 ) at each iteration. But these are nondisclosive; they 
carry no information about individual participants. And 
so, under DataSHIELD, although a full individual-level 
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analysis is enabled, no identifying or sensitive informa-
tion is physically moved, or even rendered temporarily 
visible, outside the original study in which the data were 
collected  [17] . In this way DataSHIELD seeks ‘… to elide 
privacy concerns about sharing data’ while enabling a 
flexible interrogation of the participating datasets  [2] . It 
is currently being piloted in several projects, including the 
Healthy Obese Project (HOP), under the Seventh Frame-
work Programme for Research-funded BioSHaRE study 
 [18] .
 At different times, during a typical DataSHIELD anal-
ysis, study data are interrogated in a variety of different 
ways in order to generate the information that drives the 
analysis. Different classes of interaction with the data may 
have differing rules that govern them. In this paper, we 
present an ethico-legal analysis that explores each step of 
the DataSHIELD process from the perspective of the eth-
ico-legal framework that applies in the UK. The paper 
asks what classes of data are processed at each step, and 
determines whether there is any step at which the data 
variables or summary statistics that are available outside 
the original study in which they arose may be used to in-
fer the identity of an individual or anything about his/her 
characteristics. Critically, we explore whether there is any 
sense in which  personal data, as defined by UK legislation 
and case law, is potentially revealed. We further ask 
whether the ways in which DataSHIELD generates, pro-
cesses, and transmits anonymous summaries are consis-
tent with best practice. We cite recent UK case law and 
scholarly analyses and argue that DataSHIELD reaches 
agreed UK standards of protection for the sharing of bio-
medical data. We discuss limitations to this research and 
suggest future studies that would allow researchers to im-
prove and enhance DataSHIELD processes.
 The DataSHIELD Process
Preliminary Set-Up 
 As with all joint analyses using SLMA, ILMA, or any 
other approach, DataSHIELD requires some preliminary 
steps to prepare the data before analyses can begin ( ta-
ble 1 ). Any biobank or cohort study site wishing to par-
ticipate in a DataSHIELD analysis needs to ensure that 
the appropriate ethics and scientific review and gover-
nance approvals that cover that study allow DataSHIELD 
to be used. If not, additional approval may be needed. Ap-
proval will also be needed from the study’s data access 
committee to obtain the particular set of variables needed 
for the planned analysis. Then, no joint analysis of any 
kind is possible unless the data from the different col-
laborating studies are adequately harmonised  [19] . Each 
study identifies the variables within their own main data 
repository that are required to generate these harmonised 
variables. Then, ideally with the support of a central har-
monisation unit  [20, 21] , each study constructs and runs 
algorithms to generate all of the harmonised variables. 
Finally, before beginning a DataSHIELD analysis, the 
data will be appropriately de-identified. Regardless of 
how sophisticated a secure parallelised analysis may be, 
there is a high risk of disclosure if the data feeding into 
the analysis include direct individual identifiers.
 At each collaborating centre, a dedicated data com-
puter (DC) is set up with the necessary software and ap-
propriate firewall protections. In principle, this could be 
the primary data repository for the study in question, but 
in practice it is much more straightforward to set up, 
maintain, and secure a new database and server solely for 
the purpose of the particular set of analyses that are 
planned. The DC should be set up behind the firewall of 
the collaborating study and will consist of a server run-
ning an  OPAL  instance, which provides the database en-
vironment containing the data to be shared, and an  R in-
stance , under which the DataSHIELD analysis can be car-
ried out. OPAL is the core database application for 
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biobanks and epidemiological studies that has been de-
veloped by OBiBa, an international software develop-
ment project that builds open source software for bio-
banks  [22] . R is an open source software environment and 
programming language for statistical computing  [23] . 
The DC is controlled by the collaborating study, and most 
crucially, the data are only accessible via DataSHIELD. 
The DC’s information content can be extracted under a 
valid DataSHIELD analysis, but the data themselves are 
invisible to anyone outside the study. 
 Analysis 
 Once the data are formatted as needed, DataSHIELD 
allows a researcher at an AC to begin the analysis phase. 
The analysis can be a single-step command where, for ex-
ample, the analyst issues a command in the form of a 
mathematical formula that says ‘produce a table of dis-
ease status (diseased or healthy) versus age, for four age 
groups’. In this single-step case, the DC returns to the AC 
a summary statistic which consists of a simple 2 × 4 con-
tingency table that, with one limitation, can be safely re-
turned by each study to the AC without disclosing sensi-
tive or identifying data; the AC then combines the tables 
returned by the studies into one table. The one limitation 
is that any cell containing between 1 and 4 observations 
may be potentially disclosive, so DataSHIELD prevents 
such tables from being returned. More complex analyses 
such as a regression analysis (typically a generalised linear 
model) which can be used to look at the relationship be-
tween an outcome and covariate(s) (e.g. between diabetes 
status and blood cholesterol levels) can also be run in an 
iterative process. In such advanced analysis, the AC, 
which co-ordinates the parallel analyses, sends a com-
mand (a model and its first estimates) to the DCs to fit the 
regression model. The request is then processed within 
the DC behind the study’s firewall, and a response which 
consists of summary statistics (for a generalised linear 
model the summaries are score vectors and information 
matrices) is transmitted back to the AC. The answers 
from the studies are then combined by the AC which then 
sends back updated estimates to the DCs. This iterative 
process continues until the model’s estimates remain un-
changed, producing a result that is identical to one that 
would have been achieved by harmonising the data at 
each site, pooling them into one single database and con-
ducting analyses  [15, 16] .
 DataSHIELD Data and Data Protection Principles 
 There are acknowledged difficulties in sharing sam-
ples and data across national borders, due to differing leg-
islative requirements and cultural norms  [24] . As dis-
cussed, DataSHIELD seeks to bypass these concerns by 
never sharing individual-level data outside the study in 
which they were originally collected. DataSHIELD pro-
cesses the individual-level data but is designed so that the 
information leaving each study never pertains to the in-
dividual participants and is fundamentally nondisclosive. 
But, in doing all of this, how is DataSHIELD actually pro-
Table 1.  Preliminary set-up required for all DataSHIELD analyses
1. Ethico-legal preparation
Each contributing study agrees to use DataSHIELD, having determined that this particular use of data complies with all 
institutional governance stipulations that apply and the consent given by participants, and that necessary scientific, ethics, and 
data access approvals have been obtained.
2. Epidemiological harmonisation
Together studies agree on a set of variables to be analysed and what format they will need to take (e.g. all weight measurements in 
kilograms). With the support of a central harmonisation unit, studies run algorithms to generate all of the harmonised variables.
3. Anonymisation
Each study ensures that identifiers have been removed from variables.
4. IT set-up
Each study sets up a server running OPAL (with its associated R instance for DataSHIELD) behind their firewall.
5. Database population
Each study populates the OPAL database with all of the data generated in steps 2 and 3.
6. DC ready for DataSHIELD
The populated OPAL database, linked directly to its associated R instance, represents the DC for each study (fig. 1).
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tecting the confidentiality of participant data and respect-
ing the wishes of participants regarding its use?
 Step 1 in  table 1 makes clear that governance require-
ments and participant consents for participating studies 
must comply or judged to be compatible with this form 
of scientific research. When piloting DataSHIELD as 
part of the HOP study, the consent materials from each 
biobank were reviewed to ensure that the consent lan-
guage was broad enough to encompass the processing of 
data within the biobank for research purposes and for 
the sharing of anonymised data  [18] . This review pro-
cess continues for any new biobank joining the HOP 
study.
 Step 3 in  table 1 ensures that in DataSHIELD no one 
uses variables that are potentially identifying unless it is 
absolutely essential to do so. Best practice requires the ep-
idemiologists to protect the confidentiality of research data 
 [25, 26] . For example, it is better to include just the year of 
birth (or age in years) in a dataset rather than the full date 
of birth which is more likely to identify an individual. 
However, if an analysis needs to take account of the age in 
years and a strong seasonal effect, it may be necessary to 
use the full date of birth. Although in using DataSHIELD 
no one will see individual dates of birth, it also follows best 
practice by not using inherently identifying variables if not 
necessary.
 Even when used in accordance with best practice, there 
are still a series of specific questions that demand asking 
and answering in order to indicate whether DataSHIELD 
meets legally defined criteria for security and confidenti-
ality. First, does DataSHIELD entail the processing of  per-
sonal data as defined in law and if so, what protections are 
in place? Second, under DataSHIELD, are individual-lev-
el  personal data processed comprehensively enough that 
the resultant summary statistics can be viewed as  suffi-
ciently anonymised (nondisclosive) to be viewed as no 
longer identifiable? Third, does DataSHIELD address 
concerns regarding a possible breach of a person’s right 
to privacy? Fourth, can the processing of anonymised 
data still fall under data protection principles? These 
questions are addressed in the context of UK legislation 
and case law.
 Is DataSHIELD Processing Personal Data? 
 In the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998  (DPA 1998) 
regulates uses of identifiable or ‘personal data’, defined in 
Section 1(1) as that which relates ‘… to a living individu-
al who can be identified (a) from those data, or (b) from 
those data and other information which is in the posses-
sion of, or is likely to come into the possession of the data 
controller.’ Eight data protection principles, together 
with accompanying schedules, detail the ways in which 
data must be obtained, processed, maintained, and trans-
ferred. The principles require that data are:
 • used fairly and lawfully, 
 • used for limited, specifically stated purposes, 
 • used in a way that is adequate, relevant and not exces-
sive ,
 • accurate, 
 • kept for no longer than is absolutely necessary, 
 • handled according to people’s data protection rights, 
 • kept safe and secure ,
 • not transferred outside the UK without adequate pro-
tection  [27] . 
 Processing ‘sensitive personal data’, which includes in-
formation on an individual’s physical or mental health or 
condition, may require receiving explicit consent for each 
use of data.
 During the preparatory stages of DataSHIELD and an 
analysis using it, studies will be processing individual-lev-
el, and therefore, personal data. During the set-up ( ta-
ble 1 ), studies will select and move variables into a sepa-
rate dataset, and during an analysis, the data will be inter-
rogated to calculate the score vectors and information 
matrices. But DataSHIELD is specifically designed to en-
sure that any processing of personal data is conducted 
within the contributing study behind their firewall and is, 
therefore, covered by the governance approvals obtained 
by the study prior to analysis. Studies will need adequate 
data security protocols  [28] as there is always a potential 
for someone to ‘hack’ into any study database; however, 
no additional precautions are needed due to using Da-
taSHIELD. The information returned following Data-
SHIELD requests consists of aggregated data (summary 
statistics) which are nondisclosive. This means that even 
if a hacker ‘intercepts’ the response sent back to the user, 
there will still be no breach of confidentiality.
 Are the Data Produced through a DataSHIELD 
Analysis Anonymised Data? 
 We argue that all other data produced in a DataSHIELD 
analysis is anonymised data. According to Recital 26 of 
the European Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) 
[hereafter ‘Directive’], ‘… the principles of protection 
shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way 
that the data subject is no longer identifiable.’ Therefore, 
anonymised data can be shared without referral to the 
data protection principles previously discussed. But what 
does ‘rendered anonymous’ mean? It is not defined in the 
Directive or the DPA 1998. Varying definitions exist; we 
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have chosen the interpretation used by the UK Informa-
tion Commissioner: ‘… data that does not itself identify 
any individual and that is unlikely to allow any individu-
al to be identified through its combination with other 
data.’  [26] . Several recent UK court cases have helped to 
define and clarify the acceptable use of anonymised, and 
in particular statistical, data  [29, 30] .
 The case  Common Services Agency v Scottish Informa-
tion Commissioner  [31] centred on the Common Services 
Agency’s (CSA) refusal of a request made under the Free-
dom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 for details of in-
cidents of childhood leukaemia in 2 specific regions of 
Scotland. The CSA argued that the requested statistics 
could not be released, ‘… because there was a significant 
risk of the indirect identification of living individuals due 
to the low numbers resulting from the combination of the 
rare diagnosis, the specified age group and the small geo-
graphic area.’  [31] . Therefore, these statistics were per-
sonal data under the DPA 1998 and exempt from disclo-
sure under Section 38 of the Freedom of Information 
(Scotland) Act 2002. The Scottish Information Commis-
sioner, on the other hand, argued that the data could be 
‘Barnardised’  [32] or altered to protect confidentiality 
and then disclosed.
 The judgement centred on 2 questions. First, were the 
Barnardised data anonymised data that could not iden-
tify individuals and were, therefore, not personal data as 
defined by law? Barnardisation is a recognised statistical 
disclosure control method where data are modified to 
disguise information, while not affecting its usefulness in 
analyses. Analogous methods include suppression, mi-
cro-aggregation and removing variables  [26] and are used 
widely in order to share data, such as census data, glob-
ally  [33] . The second question was whether the Bar-
nardised data remained personal data, because the CSA 
held the links that could re-establish identity.
 The Lords agreed that if it was shown that individuals 
could not be identified from the Barnardised data, then 
they were not personal data, data principles did not apply, 
and they could be disclosed. This was true even if the per-
son controlling the data held the personal data as well. 
Baroness Hale summed up the argument by stating that,
 The agency [CSA] may well have the key which links those data 
back to the individual patients. The agency therefore could iden-
tify them and remains bound by the data protection principles 
when processing the data internally. But the recipient of the infor-
mation will not be able to identify the individuals either from the 
data themselves, or from the data plus any other information held 
by the agency, because the recipient will not have access to that 
other information  [31] .
 This ‘common sense’ approach avoided the potential-
ity of making all anonymised data personal simply be-
cause the data controller held the link. The leading judge-
ment in the case, given by Lord Hope, additionally fo-
cused on the possibility that someone other than the data 
controller would have ‘other information’ as well as the 
Barnardised data, and on the duties of the data controller 
to judge whether the Barnardisation process had been 
sufficient to anonymise the data. As a result, the case was 
referred back to the Scottish Information Commissioner 
who was asked to review the Barnardisation process to see 
if it would adequately protect the individuals involved. A 
subsequent case,  Department of Health v Information 
Commission  [34] , where an agency refused to disclose sta-
tistical data about the conduct of abortions because of 
fears the data would identify individuals, confirmed the 
findings in CSA.
 These judgements have set a legal precedent in the UK 
and can be seen to clarify the requirements DataSHIELD 
analysis data must meet in order to be classed as ‘rendered 
anonymous’ and not subject to data protection principles. 
These data, held by controllers who can link internally, 
must be sufficiently Barnardised or ‘changed’ in order 
that it is no longer identifiable. DataSHIELD accomplish-
es this in different ways. The score vectors and informa-
tion matrices sent to the AC during analysis are the cal-
culations made  using the individual-level data; they are 
not the data themselves. DataSHIELD also uses various 
statistical data control measures to protect confidentiali-
ty, such as was noted earlier, preventing tables returning 
data including fewer than 5 observations. This form of 
cell suppression is a recognised method of statistical data 
control actively used by the UK Government to reduce 
the possibility of re-identification due to small numbers 
 [27] . For example, the UK Statistics of Trade Act 1947, 
which regulates the collection of personal information for 
economic purposes, states in Section 9(5)(a), ‘… no such 
report, summary or communication [of public informa-
tion] shall disclose the number of returns received with 
respect to the production of any article if that number is 
less than five.’
 In addition, there are limits on the different kinds of 
analysis that can be run on the data, which increases the 
security of the DataSHIELD process. There is an ap-
proved list of the only commands that can be sent through 
DataSHIELD preventing, as far as is possible, any disclo-
sures of identifiable data which could result from running 
potentially malicious statistical analyses or through com-
bining a string of other risky commands. We acknowl-
edge that DataSHIELD cannot avoid all disclosures, such 
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as inferential disclosure  [35] , as disclosure is a risk inher-
ent to all methodologies.
 Does the Use of Anonymised DataSHIELD Data 
Respect the Right to Privacy? 
 Recent case law has also caused legal scholars to ask 
whether the disclosure of anonymised data can be seen to 
breach an individual’s right to privacy, as set down in Ar-
ticle 8 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA1998). In 
 R v. Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics 
Ltd.  [36] ,  Source Informatics Ltd. sought anonymised 
data from pharmacists on GP prescribing habits, which 
they would sell to pharmaceutical companies to use for 
marketing purposes. The Department of Health argued 
that anonymisation did not remove the duty of confi-
dence that GPs had with their patients and that patients 
would not have wanted their data used for such commer-
cial purposes. In the first instance, the court ruled in fa-
vour of the Department of Health, stating that the use of 
the data would go beyond that which was agreed by the 
participant at the time of prescribing.
 [A] breach of confidence occurs necessarily if, without the ex-
plicit or implied consent of the confider, the confidant further dis-
closes or uses information obtained in confidence for any purpose 
other than that for which the information was provided  [37] .
 This judgement was overturned on appeal. One of the 
grounds for the decision was that there would only be a 
breach of confidence if, in further disclosing a patient’s 
data, the pharmacist was taking unfair advantage of the 
patient. Harm might be caused if the pharmacist acted in 
a way in which the patient might disapprove and, there-
fore, cause distress. The Court disagreed and stated that 
the law in this case was concerned with the protection of 
the patients’ personal privacy. Patients had no rights to 
control the further use of the data, provided their privacy 
was not put at risk. By breaking the link to the patient 
before disclosure through anonymisation, the patient 
could no longer be seen as being treated unfairly. How-
ever, one might still see a conflict with Article 8.1 of the 
HRA 1998 which states that, ‘[e]veryone has a right to 
respect for his private and family life …’ For example, as 
Beyleveld and Townend  [38] argue, if the pharmaceutical 
companies used anonymised data provided by Source 
Informatics to develop contraceptive medicines, this 
might be objectionable to Roman Catholic patients. ‘…
[R]endering personal information non-personal is sure-
ly not by itself sufficient to preclude a violation of one’s 
moral integrity.
 This case points to the need for data controllers, such 
as research studies, to ensure that the data they hold are 
used for purposes within the scientific scope of the study 
and in concert with consent agreements. As in the HOP 
study, the ethical approvals and consent materials of each 
participating study need to be examined to ensure that
the use is acceptable  [18] . In this way, studies can reas-
sure stakeholders (e.g. participants, ethics committees, 
funders) that anonymised data will be used in approved 
ways.
 Can the Processing of Anonymised DataSHIELD Data 
Still Fall under Data Protection Principles? 
 As noted earlier, Recital 26 of the Directive states that 
anonymised data fall outside data protection principles. 
However, Beyleveld and Townend  [38] have also argued 
that, using a broad definition, the processing of ano-
nymised data can still be considered processing of per-
sonal data because the anonymised data were derived 
from the personal data. We agree with the position that it 
would be inappropriate to use anonymisation simply as a 
means to avoid having to follow data protection princi-
ples  [38] . The anonymisation in the DataSHIELD process 
is integral to its design, allowing the approved movement 
of research data between studies that might have conflict-
ing regulatory schemes or consent provisions, while pro-
viding security against unwanted disclosure. However, 
while no certainty on this point is possible, we believe that 
we satisfy the need to protect data by ensuring that all di-
rect processing of personal data is conducted within the 
protected environment of the contributing study; that 
participating studies have scientific, ethics and data ac-
cess approvals in place prior to the analysis; that studies 
are clear that their consents conform with this use of data, 
and that participants are informed that anonymisation 
for further disclosure will take place.
 Limitations of This Study and Future Research 
 This paper has focused on UK requirements; 
DataSHIELD is currently being piloted in several multi-
country studies, which introduces the need to determine 
the legal and ethics review requirements for using 
DataSHIELD in other countries. Work is underway fo-
cusing on other international settings. We also acknowl-
edge that DataSHIELD may in the future be used for dif-
ferent purposes, such as quality assurance or for public 
health surveillance. Work will be needed to investigate 
any different legislative or ethics review requirements 
that might be introduced for these uses.
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 Once studies begin using DataSHIELD, we hope that 
it will become a recognised and standard methodology. If 
so, there is a question as to whether ethics approval would 
be needed for each individual DataSHIELD analysis as 
opposed to the embedding of DataSHIELD in a biobank 
or cohort study for use in multiple analyses. We suggest 
that once approval is given for a study to use DataSHIELD 
as a methodology, additional approvals for each separate 
use should not be needed. This is because the DataSHIELD 
process remains the same regardless of the variables cho-
sen; only the research questions and variables change. 
Approval for new research investigations should be con-
firmed or obtained, but not a new approval to use 
DataSHIELD in an analysis. There is precedent for our 
position. Each use of the CRIP database was deemed not 
to require separate ethics approval  [7] . However, there 
are significant differences between DataSHIELD and 
CRIP, and, therefore, this aspect would need to be ex-
plored with representatives of ethics committees.
 Is additional consent needed from participants for the 
use of their anonymised data in medical research? We 
agree with others that such a requirement could seriously 
hamper epidemiological research [see  29 ]. There is a rec-
ognised need, and support from the UK government, for 
the sharing of anonymised data for medical research  [39] . 
However, critics argue that anonymisation does not in 
fact ensure privacy  [40] . This position is supported by the 
increasing examples of re-identification of anonymised 
data through varying methodologies using publically 
available databases of information  [9–11] . Addressing 
this possibility is an important consideration for any re-
search study promising to protect confidential data. 
DataSHIELD seeks to answer this by leaving individual-
level data within the protection of the contributing stud-
ies and only sharing summary statistics that, even when 
combined with the personal data, could not identify any 
one individual. However, we also acknowledge that con-
tinued efforts will need to be made to ensure we are using 
best practice methods to protect confidentiality and re-
strict disclosure.
 Conclusion 
 Collaborative studies are increasingly using the power 
of large datasets to study complex scientific questions. 
Sharing these resources is vital  [41] but must be done in 
accordance with recognised ethico-legal practices. We 
recognise that there are concerns about anonymisation as 
a ‘cure all’ when seeking to protect the confidentiality of 
participants and enable sharing. However, we strongly 
support the position that, ‘[f]ar from potentially harming 
participants and researchers, methods and emerging tech-
nologies that work within a regulatory framework or leg-
islation demonstrate how anonymity may facilitate innu-
merable benefits.’  [42] . We believe DataSHIELD is one of 
these technologies that can in equal measures respect the 
wishes of participants to protect their data while enabling 
those data to be shared for further scientific discovery.
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